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Abstract 
Conceived and implemented through the 
development of probabilistic risk assessment 
simulations for Project Constellation, the 
Geometric Toolkit allows users to create, 
analyze, and visualize relationships between 
geometric shapes in three-space using the 
MATLAB computing environment.  The key 
output of the toolkit is an analysis of how 
emanations from one “source” geometry (e.g., a 
leak in a pipe) will affect another “target” 
geometry (e.g., another heat-sensitive 
component).  It can import computer-aided 
design (CAD) depictions of a system to be 
analyzed, allowing the user to reliably and easily 
represent components within the design and 
determine the relationships between them, 
ultimately supporting more technical or physics-
based simulations that use the toolkit.  We opted 
to develop a variety of modular, interconnecting 
software tools to extend the scope of the toolkit, 
providing the capability to support a range of 
applications.  This concept of simulation 
composability allows specially-developed tools 
to be reused by assembling them in various 
combinations.  As a result, the concepts 
described here and implemented in this toolkit 
have a wide range of applications outside the 
domain of risk assessment.  To that end, the 
Geometric Toolkit has been evaluated for use in 
other unrelated applications due to the 
advantages provided by its underlying design. 
 
1. PROBABILISTIC DESIGN ANALYSIS 
In support of Ares I, a multidisciplinary team of 
individuals from Marshall Space Flight Center 
(MSFC), the University of Alabama in 
Huntsville (UAH), Jacobs Engineering Group, 
and other organizations was formed to develop 
risk assessment and design analysis simulations 
of the spacecraft. 
 
In the risk assessment process, the spacecraft’s 
Fault Tree, Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA), and other system documentation are 
analyzed in order to formulate scenarios of 
potentially serious risks to mission success or 
crew safety.  Such scenarios can include pipe 
leaks that may damage other nearby components, 
birds striking the spacecraft during ascent, and 
other concerns.  The risk assessment team then 
creates models for each of these scenarios, runs 
them, and analyzes the results of the simulations.  
This analysis helps to determine the level of risk 
involved in a given scenario, usually as a 
function of certain parameters such as time. 
 
The risk assessment team provides input to other 
organizations within NASA.  The design 
engineering teams typically use the team’s 
analyses to determine which components or 
subsystems need revision to reduce risk; 
alternatively, an analysis might also point to 
components that have been significantly over-
designed with respect to their risks, allowing 
design engineers to relax their standards on those 
components and thus provide a weight and cost 
savings to the spacecraft design.  Aborts systems 
groups use the information and its associated 
timing data to determine when failures need to 
be detected in order to mitigate risks as well as 
where to place appropriate sensors and controls.  
Reliability and safety teams use it to provide 
detail in the Fault Tree and FMEA so that all 
parties involved have a more refined view of the 
risk situation of the spacecraft. 
 
1.1. Approach and Modeling Process:  
Designing toward Modularity 
Rather than develop each model in isolation, the 
team opted to plan toward the concept of an 
overall dynamic ascent model for the Ares 
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Figure 1.  Top-level overview of the team’s analytical approach [1]. 
 
spacecraft by introducing design principles that 
fostered reusability, commonality, and 
meaningful communication between models.  
This would make the models much more useful 
in the long run, as potential failures could be 
propagated throughout the entire system in order 
to determine their further-reaching effects and 
provide a much more accurate portrayal of the 
system’s overall risk and reliability. 
 
Consider an example of the application of this 
idea: a model that determines which engine 
components are affected by a rupture in a pipe.  
If the results of the model indicate that an 
oxygen line is damaged by the flow of gases 
emanating from the pipe’s rupture point, then it 
could trigger another model that determines what 
occurs if liquid oxygen does not reach a pump.  
Since the models are stochastic and may produce 
different results each time they are run, a given 
failure may affect different components—and 
therefore may trigger a different chain of 
models—in subsequent runs. 
 
Figure 1 shows the overall approach taken by the 
team, from analyzing potential risk scenarios to 
developing the models.  Of particular note is the 
analytical process in block 7, which shows a 
hierarchy of models. 
 
In this approach, the environmental models in 
block 7.1 collectively serve as the backbone of 
the overall risk simulation, controlling the flow 
of information from each of the individual 
physical risk simulations in block 7.2.  As the 
overarching backbone, they also provide certain 
initial conditions, including the size, shape, and 
position of components involved, to the physical 
models.  A given failure event could be triggered 
either manually or by random chance, and the 
appropriate physical model is run with certain 
initial conditions.  Outputs from this model can 
specify whether any secondary failures have 
been caused by an initial failure. 
 
Rather than use computationally expensive 
physics models for runs of the overall risk 
simulation, probability distributions of failures 
occurring as a function of certain parameters 
(including time, initial conditions, and other 
failures that have already occurred) can be 
created by running the stochastic physical 
models numerous times under all possible 
conditions.  These new statistical models, 
depicted in block 7.3, would simply become 
lookup tables of events, times, parameters, and 
probabilities, which could be executed several 
orders of magnitude faster than the physics 
models while producing statistically equivalent 
results.  The complete set of these statistical 
models, 7.4, could then be directly called by the 
environmental models to analyze failure 
propagation, providing a more complete picture 
of the overall risk involved in the spacecraft 
Figure 2.  Example of how designing models that work together aids the design analysis procedure. 
 
design. 
 
This simple set of lookup tables could become a 
database of conditional probabilities related to 
failure mechanisms, modes, and effects within 
the system.  Essentially, they become answers to 
the general question: “Given that a certain failure 
mode has occurred within a certain component, 
what is the probability of another certain failure 
mode being caused in another particular 
component?”  Starting from one triggered 
failure, these probabilities can be strung together 
to determine answers to many questions 
regarding complete risk to certain key 
components and can even help quantify overall 
system risk.  In this way, by simple probing of 
the failure space (triggering failures and 
determining how they propagate through the 
system), the complete picture of risk to the 
system can be studied. 
 
If all risk scenario models were designed to take 
advantage of this common framework and to 
work together, then, as new models were created, 
more and more of the failure space can be 
explored.  As can be shown with a few simple 
examples, the concept of cooperative risk models 
has a profound effect on the quantity of 
questions that can be answered as well as the 
quality of the answers themselves.  This overall 
approach to risk assessment has been very 
thoroughly documented by the team [1]. 
 
1.2. Example Risk Scenarios and Failure 
Propagation 
As an example of how risk simulation models 
might affect each other in a risk assessment 
simulation, consider the models in Figure 2.  The 
left diagram presents two examples of risk 
models constructed in isolation.  In this scenario, 
the fuel line leak model could answer questions 
directly related to the leak itself.  This means 
answering the general question:  “Given that 
there is a leak in the fuel line, what are the 
effects on the system as a whole?”  Specifically, 
this model may determine whether a leak will 
cause the engine to shut down due to a lack of 
fuel.  Similarly, consider a shrapnel tank breach 
model that deals with a portion of an engine 
component breaking off and penetrating the tank 
that encapsulates it.  This model could also 
answer certain questions related to that specific 
scenario, such as whether a breach of shrapnel 
will relieve pressure in the tank. 
 
Neither of these models alone can answer certain 
other questions related to risk, even within the 
limited scope of the components for which they 
are responsible.  For example, if a leak in the 
fuel line also releases hot gas onto a nearby heat-
sensitive component, then that component may 
fail and cause further unforeseen effects within 
the system.  Moreover, shrapnel breaking 
through the tank can strike and damage another 
component, which may also cause other effects 
within the system.  In fact, just as on the right 
diagram on Figure 2 suggests, shrapnel may 
strike the fuel line and cause it to leak, or a fuel 
leak may heat up the tank if it is nearby and 
cause components inside it to fragment and then 
to release additional shrapnel.  Certain 
complexities, such as parameters passed from 
one model to the other, are not shown in the 
diagram (even if shrapnel strikes the fuel line, it 
may not cause a leak if the line is struck with a 
large angle of incidence, if the velocity of the 
shrapnel is small, or if the line is resilient to 
impact-induced stresses) but it signifies just how 
the models might interact. 
 
This design principle offers the ability for the 
same models to answer many additional 
questions related to overall system risk.  One 
component’s failure could potentially trigger a 
certain failure mode (e.g. melting or distorting) 
via some failure mechanism (e.g. heat from a 
fuel line leak’s spray of hot gas) as a property of 
another component.  The secondary effect on the 
component in question may cause a higher-order 
failure within the system, or it may even cause 
further secondary effects within other 
components. 
 
Moreover, the probability of certain failure 
effects occurring is also dependent upon the 
probability of their associated failure modes 
being triggered.  This is somewhat complicated 
by the fact that failure modes can typically be 
triggered in several ways.  For example, consider 
the possibility that a leak in the fuel line may be 
caused by factors internal to the component, such 
as over-pressurization within the line, or external 
factors, such as a strike from shrapnel caused by 
another seemingly unrelated failure in another 
component.  Thus, the models that contend with 
these failure modes must be able to take into 
account the ability for other models to 
potentially cause them—the probability for a fuel 
line leak to occur is then a function of other 
probabilities, including the probability for over-
pressurization to occur and the probability for 
shrapnel to break through the tank and strike the 
fuel line.  The second of these factors is also 
comprised of certain probabilities, such as the 
probability for the tank to fail by shrapnel 
breaking through it in the first place and the 
probability that, given the fact that shrapnel has 
broken through the tank, the shrapnel will strike 
the fuel line.  In addition, any secondary effects 
that can be induced by a leak in the fuel line are 
also dependent upon all of these probabilities.  In 
fact, some of these dependencies are circular; a 
fuel line leak may cause shrapnel to break 
through the tank, or vice versa.  This problem 
can be solved through iteration, a form of which 
naturally occurs when the overall risk model is 
run numerous times and appropriate data is 
collected. 
 
In terms of probabilities of the two leak-causing 
events occurring, the overall probability of a leak 
in the fuel line can be quantified by their 
associated probabilities as follows: 
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With virtually endless scenarios that could cause 
a certain failure to occur, the overall picture of 
component and system risk becomes more 
complicated than may have been previously 
foreseen. However, the reduction of these risks 
to mere probabilities in lookup tables eases the 
process of assessing risks due to the ability to 
determine these probabilities beforehand with 
physical models, then chain them together using 
calls to these lookup tables.  If the risk models 
are designed to interoperate, then they can create 
a more accurate representation of the 
probabilities associated with failures within the 
system. 
 
2. MOTIVATION FOR THE 
GEOMETRIC TOOLKIT 
The magnitude of secondary failure effects is 
dependent upon several parameters.  In the case 
of the fuel line leak example, such factors may 
include the material properties of nearby 
components, a quantification of the shape and 
magnitude of the leak, and the geometric 
relationship between the fuel line and the 
components in question.  Although the 
methodology behind solving the problem is 
different, the scenario involving shrapnel 
breaking through a tank and striking another 
component requires similar parameters.  Indeed, 
certain general capabilities, including statistical 
analysis, visualization, and evaluation of spatial 
relationships between components within the 
spacecraft, are required for many of these risk 
simulations.  These and other capabilities have 
been realized through a series of software 
toolkits, such as the Geometric Toolkit. 
 
Figure 3.  Generalization of the problem of a 
“source” component affecting a “target” 
component. 
 
Regarding the problem of geometric 
relationships between components, many of the 
scenarios involved one “source” component 
affecting another “target” component.  In many 
cases, the degree to which the target is affected 
depends upon certain key parameters in the 
geometric relationship between the two 
components as well as the relationship between 
points on their surface.  Heat transfer from a leak 
in a fuel line is strongest in a direction normal to 
the line’s surface and emanating from the point 
at which the leak occurs, and its strength tapers 
off as the angle of incidence increases.  
Similarly, a piece of shrapnel will travel in a 
straight line (some statistical deviation from the 
tank’s surface normal) and could strike a target.  
It will transfer much more energy to the target if 
the angle of incidence is small.  Figure 3 shows 
how these example scenarios can each make use 
of the same geometric parameters for analysis 
purposes. 
 
3. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
GEOMETRIC TOOLKIT 
As discussed, the problem of assessing the 
overall risk of a spacecraft had been divided into 
a series of models that can be connected together 
in a meaningful fashion.  The set of risk models 
is said to be composable—that is, that the 
components can be combined into a variety of 
combinations to suit various purposes [2].  This 
is similar to the concept of interoperability, 
although it may not necessarily imply an 
underlying distributed simulation framework.  
Specifically, these composable engineering 
simulations are closest to the definition of the 
common library, modular approach to 
composability.  In essence, this means that the 
individual models can be seen as reusable tools 
or modules designed by a team and belonging to 
a large library of modules that are designed to 
work together [3]. 
 
Due to the success of this approach to 
composability in the development of the 
individual risk simulations, it was decided to 
follow a similar approach with the creation of the 
Geometric Toolkit.  Just as the set of cooperative 
risk models can potentially answer many more 
questions than standalone models, a large task 
such as defining geometric relationships can suit 
a wider variety of applications if it were split into 
a set of composable tools.  Each tool in the 
toolkit has a very specific purpose in mind, and 
the tools can be chained together to solve more 
complex problems. 
 
The programming environment of choice for the 
bulk of the team’s analysis is MATLAB, 
primarily due to its visualization capabilities, its 
overall familiarity, and its ability to perform 
rapid calculations involving matrices and 
vectors.  The Geometric Toolkit heavily utilizes 
MATLAB’s visualization and matrix 
manipulation capabilities. 
 
Two general approaches to this geometric 
analysis problem were taken in parallel; the 
Patch Toolkit and the Analytical Toolkit are both 
subsets of the Geometric Toolkit.  The Patch 
Toolkit works with MATLAB “patches,” which 
are effectively polygonal representations of 
complex geometries within MATLAB.  The 
Analytical Toolkit works with mathematically-
defined geometries, such as cylinders and 
spheres, and can produce rapid results for these 
specialized cases.  In some scenarios, tools in 
both of the subset toolkits can also work together 
toward a common goal. 
 
3.1. The Patch Toolkit Subset 
Like many complex engineering systems, the 
spacecraft engine analyzed by the risk 
assessment team has been represented in CAD 
by its designers.  Using methods inspired from a 
MATLAB script generously posted online (see 
[4]), the team created a tool to import CAD 
depictions of components under analysis as the 
first tool in the Patch Toolkit.  The output of this 
tool, a MATLAB patch representation of CAD 
components, could then be used by other 
analysis and visualization tools in the toolkit.  
This process helps ensure more accurate results 
in the geometric analysis, since the shapes of the 
components can be more accurately represented 
if they come directly from the components’ CAD 
designs. 
 
Given again the assumption that the bulk of an 
emanation from a source geometry occurs 
normal to the point on its surface where it 
“leaks,” the next step would then be to determine 
how a target may potentially be affected by this 
emanation.  The approach was to develop a 
method to determine the “hit” point on a target 
geometry for every possible emanation point on 
a source geometry, given two or more 
components imported and ready for use by the 
routine. 
 
In keeping with the concept of composability, 
this step was broken down into a few 
interconnecting pieces.  First, a tool was 
developed to determine the intersection of a 
target geometry with a three-dimensional ray, as 
defined by a single point and a vector to 
determine direction.  Then, another tool creates 
these rays by taking a source geometry and 
determining vectors normal to each point on its 
surface.  Finally, yet another tool wraps over 
these and the shape importation tool in order to 
tie them all together. 
 
Keeping all of these distinct steps in separate 
tools allows for a large degree of customization 
to suit the problem at hand.  For example, 
instead of analyzing each surface point on the 
source, one can use another tool to determine 
several random points where a source may leak 
in order to speed analysis.  Using another tool, 
emanations can bend from the normal vector to 
varying degrees.  Yet another tool is present to 
supplement analyses of vectors that do not 
intersect with the target. 
 
It has been demonstrated that, through the 
extended use of the basic geometric tools in the 
Patch Toolkit, much more appropriate and 
accurate analyses can be performed.  For 
example, complex heat transfer models or energy 
models can be injected into the chain of tools at 
appropriate points in order to receive and process 
geometric data about the source and target, then 
produce results appropriate to solving the 
problem at hand. 
 
3.2. The Analytical Toolkit Subset 
MATLAB patches are represented as polygons, 
and many of the methods used to analyze 
geometric relationships between shapes must 
rely on “brute-force” methods.  In any case 
where engine components can be represented as 
simple shapes, an analytical, mathematical 
method would be more appropriate, as it would 
lead to more rapid and more accurate 
calculations.  Indeed, the Analytical Toolkit is 
derived from this concept.  Many components 
under analysis are pipes, which can be divided 
into cylinders and “elbows” (sections of toroids), 
so the team started with algorithms to define 
relationships between geometries of those types.  
These algorithms are the product of rigorous 
mathematical derivation and are detailed in a 
separate 46-page document [5].  While only the 
tools related to cylinders have been implemented 
and validated, development of tools to work with 
other shapes is underway. 
 
Figure 4.  Importing an engine component’s 
shape into MATLAB as a patch and as a set of 
cylinders. 
 
Similar to the CAD importation tool in the Patch 
Toolkit, a tool was created to define the 
cylindrical portions of components so that 
relationships can be defined analytically.  The 
tool can create an analytical cylinder for use with 
other Analytical Toolkit tools, using three points 
on the cylinder as input.  One can find these 
points very easily with a CAD package such as 
Pro/ENGINEER,. Figure 4 shows an engine 
component represented in MATLAB as both a 
patch and as a series of mathematically-defined 
cylinders. 
 
The geometric relationship tools in the 
Analytical Toolkit have similar aims as those in 
the Patch Toolkit, such as calculating factors like 
the angle of incidence between a point on the 
source and a point on the target, visualizing the 
components and vectors, and so forth.  The way 
in which these tools can be combined and 
recombined is also similar to the way in which 
tools in the Patch Toolkit can be composed. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The Geometric Toolkit has been used 
successfully in Ares risk analysis applications, 
providing geometric relationship data to 
simulations that carry out the more specialized 
physics-based analysis for certain risk scenarios.  
The concept of composable risk simulations has 
led directly into the concept of composable 
geometric relationship tools.  Due to the 
sensitive nature of these studies, the exact results 
cannot be explained in detail; however, it can be 
stated that having the capability to define 
geometric relationships between components—
as well as the ability to exercise the tools’ 
composability and flexibility—has aided studies 
similar to the examples that have been discussed. 
 
It has been demonstrated that maintaining a set 
of relatively simple tools that can work together 
is often much more worthwhile than complex 
“end-to-end” solutions.  By their nature, the 
latter category of software solutions have 
predefined boundaries—their ends—that prohibit 
their continual reuse to solve problems in the 
future.  By contrast, the small, modular tools 
owe their distinction to their more streamlined 
and straightforward capabilities, small memory 
and disk space footprints, and overall degree of 
customizability.  Most of all, they have the 
ability to work with other tools, which increases 
their versatility and power without having an ill-
defined scope.  Other tools can always be 
developed to interface with them, so their 
effective scope is always increasing.  Indeed, 
several Unix-based software utilities initially 
developed several decades ago, such as grep, 
awk, sed, and vi, are still in widespread use 
today due to their adherence to this philosophy 
of modular software design. 
 
Counter-intuitively, a program or model that can 
be relegated to a mere link in a chain of tools is 
often more flexible than one that attempts to 
solve multiple varied problems on its own.  A 
single model that determines, analyzes, and 
produces the results of one specific scenario is 
typically rendered useless after its problem has 
been solved.  One can approach a thorough, top-
down solution, such as an integrated vehicle risk 
assessment, by breaking the problem down and 
providing solutions from the bottom up.  One 
can also take a subset of these tools and apply 
them to a wildly different problem.  The number 
of possibilities provided by a set of small tools is 
virtually endless, if they have been designed with 
composability and cooperation between models 
as a goal from the outset. 
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Probabilistic Design Analysis
• Team objective:  Analyze risks in support of Ares I Crew Launch Vehicle
Revolve around “what if” questions/secondary effects/conditional probabilities–       
– Overall analysis procedure
• Select scenarios to investigate
• Develop standalone engineering simulations for each scenario
D i d ith i t bilit i i d id tif f i k– es gne  w  n eropera y n m n —can en y un orseen r s s
• Analyze the simulation results
• Validate results against existing system, if possible
• Provide risk and timing information to several entities
Design engineering teams–   
– Reliability and safety teams
– Integrated aborts teams
– Back to FMEA/Fault Tree
• Many failure simulations share certain characterics
– Statistical analysis
– Visualization capability
– Geometric relationships between components
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PDA Simulation Development Approach
Analytical Process
Data Collection Technical Questions Environmental Models
Physics Models
Failure Mode Propagation
Statistical
Failure Mode Models
Statistical Ensemble
System Models
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PDA:  Examples of Standalone Models
Initial Conditions Initial Conditions
• Will a fuel leak cause engine 
shutdown?
Questions Answered
Fuel Line Leak
Model
Shrapnel Tank
Breach Model
• Will shrapnel from the housed tank 
strike and damage other 
components?
• Will the breach relieve pressure in 
the casing?
Fuel Line Leak
Rough Estimate of
Effects
Rough Estimate of
Effects
“Given that “Given that 
there is athere is a fuel 
line leak, 
what are the 
effects?”
   
shrapnel 
breach in the 
housed tank, 
what are the 
effects?”
Shrapnel 
Breaking Through 
Housed Tank 
Casing
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PDA:  Examples of Secondary Effects
Initial Conditions
More Accurate
Depiction of Effects
Shrapnel Breach Model
Fuel Line Leak
Model
Shrapnel Hits
Fuel Line?
Yes
• Will a fuel leak cause engine 
shutdown?
Questions Answered
…
“Given that there is a shrapnel breach, does it cause a 
fuel line leak?  If so, what further effects are there?”
No • Will shrapnel from the housed tank 
strike and damage other 
components?
• Will the breach relieve pressure in 
the casing?
C b h f h l i th
Fuel Line Leak Model
Initial Conditions
More Accurate
Depiction of Effects
• an a reac  o  s rapne  n e 
component casing cause the engine 
to shut down?
• …
• Can a fuel line leak cause pressure 
to be relieved in the housed tank?   
Shrapnel Breach
Model
Leak Heats
Housed Tank?
Yes
N
      
• …
• Can certain other components be 
affected?
• ……
“Given that there is a fuel line leak, does it cause a 
shrapnel breach?  If so, what further effects are there?”
o
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Geometric Toolkit as a Common Framework
• Initiated by the PDA team’s Gas Generator study, but designed for 
general use 
• Developed in the MATLAB programming environment
• Helps evaluate potential effects from points on a “source” geometry 
on a “target” geometry   
• Determines important geometric factors
– Angle of incidence, normal vector, etc.
• Can import CAD data for real components      
Source
Target
Target Point
Example Risk Scenarios
Generalization
αSource Point
 
Sn
Tn
,...),,,( αTS nndfT
v=Heat Transfer Shrapnel
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Composability in the Toolkit
• Toolkit contains several specialized tools
A l ti l T l W k ith th ti ll d fi d h– na y ca  oo s:  or  w  ma ema ca y- e ne  s apes
– Patch Tools:  Work with MATLAB “Patches”
• Designed to be configurable to suit a variety of applications
I i d b U i d i hil h– nsp re  y n x es gn p osop y
– Tools have well-defined inputs and outputs
– Can be strung together in a toolchain
Some tools provide redundant functionality but at a different level–     ,     
• Modularity of software design aids designing toward composability
– Breaking large, complicated packages down into smaller, simple ones
– The whole is greater than the sum of its parts
• Individual parts are more specialized
• Small pieces can be connected in a variety of ways
• Versatility and reliability are increased naturally
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Determine All
Possible Rays from
Patch Surface 
Example Use Cases:  Patch Shapes
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Determine All
Possible Rays from
Patch Surface 
Example Use Cases:  Patch Shapes
Source Cylinder #1 Create Cylinder
Create Elbow
P t h
Intersect Rays
with Patch
Visualize
Intersections
Parameters
 
Patch
Merge Patches
Source Elbow
Parameters a c  
Create Cylinder
Patch
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Patch
Vi li
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Example Use Cases:  Patch Shapes
Other configurations are possible with     
creative combinations of Geometric Toolkit 
shape creation tools  
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Example Use Cases:  Patch from CAD
Visualize
Patch
Transform
CAD to Patch
Determine All
Possible Rays from
Patch Surface 
Intersect Rays
with Patch
Visualize
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Transform
CAD to Patch
Target CAD Visualize
Patch
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Example Use Cases:  Patch from CAD
Visualize
Patch
Transform
CAD to Patch
Determine All
Possible Rays from
Patch Surface 
Intersect Rays
with Patch
Visualize
Intersections
Source CAD
Transform
CAD to Patch
Target CAD Perform Spline
Curve
Transformation
Visualize
Patch
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Example Use Cases:  Patch from CAD
Transform
CAD to Patch
Determine All
Possible Rays from
Patch Surface 
Intersect Rays
with Patch
Source CAD
Transform
CAD to Patch
Determine
Probability of Hit
By Random Leak
Target CAD
Point Hit
P1 1
P2 1
P3 0
P 14
P5 0
P6 1
P7 1
… …
Probability 0.573
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Analytical Toolkit’s Cylinder Definition
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Example Use Cases:  Analytical Cylinders
Visualize
Cylinder
Calculate
Vectors to All
Points on Target
Visualize
Vectors
Source Cylinder Defining Points Generate
Mathematical
Cylinder
Choose
Random Source
Points
Target Cylinder Defining Points Generate
Mathematical
Cylinder
Visualize
Cylinder
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Example Use Cases:  Patch and Analytical
Visualize
Cylinders
Transform
CAD to Patch
Visualize
Patch
Calculate
Vectors to All
Points on Target
Visualize
Vectors
Source CAD Generate
Mathematical
Cylinders
Choose
Random Source
Points
Get Cylinder
Points
Get Cylinder
Points
Target CAD Generate
Mathematical
Cylinders
Visualize
Cylinders
Transform Visualize
CAD to Patch Patch
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The Gas Generator Study
• One of several studies undertaken by the PDA team
• Wanted to answer several questions
– Which other J-2X engine components are in the vicinity of the 
Gas Generator’s leak point?   
• Can look at CAD depiction
– Which of these would be most likely to fail from secondary 
effects?
• Observe quantity of heat transfer from leak, material properties
– Which scenarios could potentially lead to a failure in the Gas 
Generator?
– What other secondary effects could occur from a Gas 
Generator leak (e.g. thrust/engine performance)?
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Geometric Toolkit’s Contribution
• Heat transfer from Gas Generator is 
dependent upon the spatial relationship
GG (Source) 
Target
Target Point
Sn
     
between it and a given “target” 
component
• Many J-2X engine components are 
composed of pipes (cylinders and
α
,...),,,( αTS nndfT
v=
d
r
Leak Point
     
elbows)
– Can model potential leak points on GG 
using cylindrical coordinate points
– Can cover most of target areas with
Tn
CAD Depiction
       
mathematically-represented cylinders
– Can easily derive spatial relationships 
between points on two cylinders
• Points on existing CAD drawings can      
define mathematical shapes
• Other tools exist in the Geometric 
Toolkit to handle more complex 
t igeome r es
MATLAB Patch Series of Cylinders
Designing a Composable Geometric Toolkit… 20
Geometry and Heat Transfer Logic
• Partition source into cylinders
F h t t
R
Y
• or eac  arge …
– Partition target into cylinders
– For each cylinder on the source…
• For each target cylinder…
O
M
E
T
R
– For every point on the source cylinder and target cylinder…
• Determine whether the source point can “hit” target point
• Calculate and record geometric parameters in a matrix
G
E
O
• Choose a set of random columns (e.g. points on GG)
– For each row (all points on all targets)…
E
R
• Pass associated parameters to thermal model
• Run thermal model and collect transient heat data at each point
– For each target…
• Run surface heat transfer FEMH
E
A
T
R
A
N
S
F
E
• “Roll up” results statistically
T
R
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Geometry and Heat Transfer Logic
Find and record points in CAD Determine relationships between
components
J-2X CAD CylindricalDefinition
Defining points on 
cylinders for each 
target
Part numbers 
of targets to be 
analyzed
Geometric
Analysis
Definition of
targets as
f(R, Z, Θ,…) Thermo
Geometric
relationship between
source points
and target points
(Ԃ, α, …) Material 
Depiction Routine Routine Analysis
Potential thermal
t ib ti f h l k
properties 
and 
operational 
parameters
con r u on rom eac  ea  
source point to every point 
on target components
Statistical
Analysis
For a set of random leak source points…
•Probability that GG will contribute heat to each target
•Probability that GG will damage each target
MATLAB
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Use Case for GG Problem
J-2X CAD Visualize
Cylinders
Transform
CAD to Patch
Visualize
Patch
SOURCE
Calculate
Intersections
and Parameters
Visualize
Intersections
Generate
Mathematical
Cylinders
Gather Source
Points
Get Cylinder
Points
  
Define Source
and Targets
Get Cylinder
Points
Generate
Mathematical
Cylinders
TARGETS
Visualize
Cylinders
Transform
CAD to Patch
Visualize
Patch
Run Heat
Transfer FEM
Perform
Statistical
Analysis
Determine
Probability of Hit  
By Random Leak
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Face Validation of Geometric Toolkit
Gas Generator 
Covered Target
Areas (Cylinders) 
Uncovered Target
Areas (Elbows) 
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Summary of Study
• Modularity of software design can facilitate      
model composability
• Many varied problems have certain aspects      
in common
Th S t E i i “V” li• e ys ems ng neer ng  app es
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